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The paper examines the quality of the business climate in the group of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS) from the prospective of the level of development of entrepreneurship, and 
individual countries’ attractiveness to the foreign direct investments (FDI). The analysis suggests that 
the main obstacles for further improvements of the business climate in this group of countries are 
high level of corruption, inefficiency in the existing system of tax administration and regulation, dis-
cretionary implementation of custom and trade regulations, low level of property rights protection, 
and macroeconomic instability. Some explanations of the historical and institutional causes of these 
business impediments are provided. 
Although the net FDI inflow to CIS countries has been substantially increased since the time they 
gained independence, it’s still well bellow than in Central & Eastern Europe Countries (CEE). The 
number of private enterprises per capita vastly varies within the CIS countries, with some of them 
approaching the OECD level, but some else lagging far behind. FDI stocks also unequally distribute 
within the CIS group. Fuel exporting countries are better off than fuel importing countries, although 
the individual country’s business climate within two groups does not differ significantly. 
As a conclusion, paper suggests a number of concrete public policy recommendations aiming to 
improve business climate in the CIS region.  
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This paper focuses on discussing the deep systemic causes of the existing business and in-
vestment climate in the CIS, its potential negative implications for economic growth and possible 
cures
1. 
1. The business climate in CIS countries: Survey evidence 
An extensive body of survey data gathered by the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, 
and other institutions indicates that business climates in many CIS
2 countries are much less favor-
able than those in CEB
3 countries. These data also point to extensive variation in business condi-
tions among CIS countries. This variation no doubt reflects the results of efforts taken to improve 
business conditions in many CIS countries, particularly after the 1998 crisis. But it may also reflect 
weaknesses in the available tools for assessing business conditions in CIS countries. These 
weaknesses stem from the use of subjective assessments by business people and managers con-
cerning the extent of barriers to doing business in individual countries. In addition, such measures 
do not generally lend themselves to cross-country comparisons. 
The World Bank’s Cost of Doing Business (CODB) survey
4 attempts to avoid these problems by 
comparing such objective indicators as the costs, number, and duration of bureaucratic procedures. 
These data indicate that companies in CIS countries face significantly higher costs of enforcing con-
tracts and acquiring commercial information than do firms in CEB countries
5. However, although im-
portant, the costs of doing business are not sufficient proxies for business conditions in general
6. 
Numbers of firms (particularly non-agricultural firms) per capita can also serve as a proxy for 
the business climate. Judging by this indicator, business climates in CIS countries generally look 
somewhat worse than in CEB, and even Balkan states (Figure 1). However, Russia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine do not compare quite so badly. However, even in countries with relatively large numbers of 
businesses per capita, business climates leave much room for improvement. Business climates in 
relatively successful Russia and Ukraine (in terms of per capita businesses) were ranked 60 and 
                                                  
1  This work has been done as the contribution to the UNDP CIS Regional Human Development Report. The authors are 
grateful to Kseniya Lyapina, Dmitry Lyapin, and Irina Piontkivska for useful discussions and comments; and to Edvard 
Novoseletsky, Alexander Bilothserkivets, and Heghine Manassyan for the kind help in data mining. However, the 
views and proposals presented in this paper belong to the authors and not necessarily to the UNDP, CASE and CASE 
Ukraine. 
2  Due to the absence of data we do not consider Turkmenistan when discussing the issues of business climate. 
3  For the purpose of this paper, CEB refers to the following countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. 
4  http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/default.aspx. 
5  The values for the confidence intervals may be overstated because they are calculated based on country averages. 
The raw data are not available. 
6  Firms can adjust to the relative costs of engaging in various activities, thereby avoiding the most burdensome obsta-
cles. Thus, even if one could calculate the total costs of business obstacles for a “typical” firm in a particular country, 
these costs would not be comparable across countries, because the “typical” firms would be different. Also, because 
business surveys typically focus on formal or monetized barriers, they can ignore important informal costs. Sometimes 
they also tend to overstate the formal barriers. For example, although the formal costs of compliance with regulations 
governing the hiring or firing of employees are higher in CIS countries than in the new EU member states, in most 
cases these regulations can be easily circumvented in CIS countries. As a result, the actual importance of labor regu-
lations as business impediments is much lower in CIS than in CEB countries.  
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71 respectively out of the 104 countries surveyed in the 2004 Global Competitiveness Report7. 
While being close to those of Balkan countries, these rankings lagged far behind most EU new 
member states, which were typically between 30 and 40 (GCR, 2004). 
Figure 1. Numbers of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs in the CIS, and some other transition 
countries 




















Per a 1000 of population. Blue bars refer to the legal persons, empty bars refer to the total numbers (including the indi-
vidual entrepreneurs). 
The exact definitions of a legal entity and an individual entrepreneur vary from country to country. These categories can 
overlap, which may cause some entities counted twice. We used the most recent available data assuming that the num-
bers of business entities do not change rapidly. For some countries the numbers for individual entrepreneurs are missed, 
which does not necessary mean that they are non-existent in these countries. Such data are collected by the national 
statistic bodies just in some CIS countries. 
Sources: national yearbooks, and state statistical agencies websites, except for the number of individual entrepreneurs in 
Russia (for July 1, 2002) that is based on the tax authorities data (http://offline.business-magazine.ru/2002/10/23008). 
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Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2004). 
                                                  
7  Only Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia were included in this ranking.  
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Business survey evidence based on subjective assessments obtained from three different 
World Bank business surveys (WBES, BEEPS
8, and ICA
9) suggest that the major impediments to 
doing business are quite similar in most CIS countries. The results of the surveys are generally 
consistent with one another, and suggest the following conclusions: 
•  Corruption in the CIS is a much more important obstacle to doing business than in the CEB or 
Balkan countries. However, it is much less significant than in the Middle East, North Africa, and 
Southern Asia. 
•  Although taxation is generally ranked as a critical barrier to doing business in CIS countries, 
this is due primarily to tax administration, rather than to tax rates per se.
10 By contrast, whereas 
tax rates are seen as the most important impediment to doing business in the CEE countries, 
tax administration is regarded as much less severe problem in these countries. 
•  Custom and trade regulations present more important obstacles for business in the CIS than in 
the CEB and Balkan countries. This difference suggests that these regulations in CIS are 
overly complex and/or discretionary implemented, which to a certain extent can result from 
“state capture”. 
•  Property rights (at least contract enforcement and investor protection) are substantially weaker 
in the CIS than in CEB (see Table 1). 
•  Macroeconomic instability is a larger barrier to conducting business in the CIS countries than in 
the CEE countries. 
                                                  
8  EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) undertaken in 2002. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps2002. 
9  Investment Climate Assessment survey; the World Bank Group, 2002. 
http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ica_standard.htm. 
10   Thanks to flat taxes and other tax reforms introduced in the last five years, tax rates in CIS countries are generally 
lower than in the EU new member states, although recent tax reforms introduced in the Baltic states, Slovakia, and 
elsewhere are narrowing this gap. Table 1. Selected objective characteristics of the business impediments in CIS, CEE and Baltic countries (CODB, 2002-2003). 
Country ARM AZE BLR GEO KAZ KGZ MDA  RUS UKR UZB CIS 
aver. CZK SVK PLN HUN CEE 
aver. EST LVA LTU  CEB 
aver. 
Number of procedures  10 14 16 9 9 8 10 9 15 9 10.9 10 9 10 6 8.8678 8 . 0  
Time (days)  25 123 79 25 25 21 30 36 34 35 43.3 40 52 31 52 43.8 72 18 26 41.6 
Cost (% of income per capita)  7 14.7 25.3 13.7 10.5 11.6 18.6 6.7 17.6 17 14.3 10.8 5.7 20.6 22.9 15.0 7.5 17.6 3.7 12.7 
Starting a Business 
Min. capital (% of income per capita)  4.5 0 44.3 54.5 32.7 0.6 24.6 5.6113.9 21.9 30.3 44.5 46.1237.9 86.4103.7 49.7 41.4 62.8 81.3 
Difficulty of Hiring Index  17 33 33 17 0 33 33 0 33 33 23.2 44 0 11 11 16.5 11 78 33 26.9 
Rigidity of Hours Index  40 40 60 60 60 40 60 60 80 40 54.0 20 20 60 80 45.0 80 20 60 48.6 
Difficulty of Firing Index  50 40 70 70 20 40 70 20 80 100 56.0 20 10 30 30 22.5 40 50 30 30.0 
Rigidity of Employment Index  36 38 54 49 27 38 54 27 64 58 44.5 28 10 34 40 28.0 44 49 41 35.1 
Hiring and Firing 
Workers 
Firing Costs (weeks)  17 42 21 21 17 21 21 17 94 28 29.9 22 17 25 34 24.5 33 42 34 29.6 
Number of procedures  4 7 7 8 8 7569 1 2 7 . 34574 5 . 04 1 03 5 . 3  
Time (days)  18 61 231 39 52 15 81 37 93 97 72.4 122 22 204 79106.8 65 62 3 79.6  Registering Property 
Cost (% of property value per capita)  0.9 0.5 0.2 2.5 1.8 5.3 1.3 0.8 4.3 11.8 2.9 3 3.1 1.6 6.8 3.6 0.5 2.1 0.9 2.6 
Cost to create Collateral (% of income 
per capita)  0.9 9.2 3.6 30 4.1 12.4 1.5 11.6 3.5 1 7.8 0.6 20.1 1.2 13.5 8.9 .. 1.5 4.1 6.8 
L e g a l  R i g h t s  I n d e x   4657586365 5 . 56925 5 . 5. .84 5 . 7  
C r e d i t  I n f o r m a t i o n  I n d e x   0030000000 0 . 35343 3 . 8543 3 . 9  
Public registry coverage (borrowers 
per 1000 capita)  00. .0000000 0 . 0 2 1600 6 . 806 4 4 1 1 . 0  
Getting Credit 
Private bureau coverage (borrowers 
per 1000 capita)  0000000000 0 . 0 2 4 90 3 8 0 3 3 165.5 95 0 0108.1 
P r o t e c t i n g  I n v e s t o r s   D i s c l o s u r e  I n d e x   3215533334 3 . 26645 5 . 3456 5 . 1  
Number of procedures  24 25 28 18 41 46 37 29 28 35 31.1 22 27 41 21 27.8 25 23 17 25.1 
Time (days)  195 267 250 375 400 492 280 330 269 368322.6 300 565 1000 365557.5 150 189 154389.0  Enforcing Contracts 
Cost (% of debt)  17.8 19.8 20.7 31.7 8.5 47.9 16.2 20.3 11 18.1 21.2 9.6 15 8.7 8.1 10.4 10.6 11 14.1 11.0 
Time (years)  1.9 2.7 5.8 3.2 3.3 3.5 2.8 1.5 2.6 4 3.1 9.2 4.7 1.4 2 4.3 3 1.1 1.2 3.2 
C o s t  ( %  o f  e s t a t e )   4844 1 8484 1 84 7 . 6 1 8 1 8 1 8 2 3 1 9 . 3848 1 3 . 9   Closing a Business 
Recovery Rate (cents on the dollar)  39.6 33.2 11.9 20.4 13.4 24.4 29.3 48.4 25.5 12.5 25.9 16.8 39.6 68.2 30.8 38.9 40 85 52.4 47.5 
Note. Confidence intervals are calculated based on the country averages. Excluding of outliers does not change the qualitative conclusions. 
Source: CODB survey results provided by the World Bank; averages and confidence intervals - authors’ calculations. 2. Foreign Direct Investment in the CIS 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important engine of growth, and is sought by virtually all 
countries. FDI inflows provide financial capital, technology, managerial skills, information, and 
goods and services that are needed to strengthen economic growth and reduce poverty
11. FDI in-
flows are particularly important in transition economies with their limited domestic savings and 
large investment needs. 
The CIS countries have performed poorly in terms of attracting FDI. Aggregate investment in 
the CIS countries contracted sharply following the breakup of the Soviet Union (Campos and Co-
ricelli, 2002), and FDI inflows have generally fallen short of levels needed to offset low domestic 
investment rates (see Figure 3). Despite the CIS countries’ large endowment in terms of rich natu-
ral resources, highly educated labor forces, and potentially large markets, the only countries that 
have recorded any significant successes in attracting FDI (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) have done 
so in the energy sector (principally extraction or energy transportation infrastructure). Some up-
surges in FDI were related to large privatization transactions or settlement of energy debts (Shiells, 
2003). Macroeconomic instability, political uncertainty, corruption, underdeveloped financial sec-
tors, and inadequate protection of property rights have been the major barriers to FDI in CIS coun-
tries. At the beginning of 2000, cumulative FDI inflows to CIS region totaled about $23 billion
12. 
However, the aggregate FDI record of CIS countries could have been better unless the Russian 
financial crisis that adversely affected capital flows into the whole region. 
Foreign investors seek out locations in countries with prudential macroeconomic policies, in-
cluding internal (low inflation rate) and external (predictable and stable exchange rate) stability. 
Since 2000 improved macroeconomic performance generally led to an increase in capital flows to 
CIS region, but owing to generally weak business climate foreign investment inflows growth has 
not been significant enough to catch up with CEB countries (see Figure 2). 
Nevertheless, even countries with abundant energy resources, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakh-
stan, and particularly Russia, have not succeeded in attracting levels of cumulative FDI inflows per 
capita (or per unit of output) comparable to those into the CEB countries. For instance, inward FDI 
stock to the whole CIS region in 2003 reached just $230 per capita, compared to $1,271 for Po-
land, $4,202 for the Czech Republic and $ 2,627 for Croatia. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan that re-
ceived slightly above $1,000 of cumulative FDI per capita in 2003 are the CIS leaders. 
A major reason for poor FDI record of CIS countries is sluggish pace of market reforms in 
these countries compared to CEE region. For example, FDI inflows in CEE were originally trig-
gered by the privatization of leading industrial and financial companies to strategic foreign inves-
tors, which indicated adequate investment climates and led to further greenfield investments. This 
underscores the fact that countries that receive significant amounts of FDI via privatization are 
                                                  
11   See, among others, UNCTAD (2001), World Bank (2001). JP Morgan (1998) estimates that among transition econo-
mies, a 1.0 percentage point increase in FDI (measured as a proportion of GDP), increases per capita income by 0.8 
percent. 
12   In this section we relied on the own calculations using data of UNCTAD World Investment Report (2004), unless oth-
erwise is specified.  
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more to receive larger greenfield FDI inflows subsequently. The CIS economies have not made 
good use of this rule of thumb, however, due to their emphasis on selling state enterprises to insid-
ers (managers, workers, other members of ruling elites) at concessionary prices. Because of their 
mineral and energy wealth, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan constitute partial exceptions to this pattern. 
Azerbaijan’s annual average FDI inflows almost quadrupled during 2001-2003 (compared to 1992-
2000), rising to $1.6 billion. But even these countries have been unable to attract significant 
greenfield FDI outside of the mineral and energy sectors (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Average Annual FDI Inflows to CIS countries 
1992-2000 2001-2003   
USD million 
% change 
CIS 4707.1  8102.6  72 
Azerbaijan 417.5  1634.6  292 
Russia 2321.6  2358.0  2 
Kazakhstan 1039.9  2497.8  140 
Turkmenistan 104.9  123.3  18 
Fuel exporters average (4)  790.0  1246.8  58 
Armenia 76.5  131.0  71 
Tajikistan 16.2  25.7  59 
Uzbekistan 77.7  72.7  -6 
Belarus 141.3  171.1  21 
Moldova 51.0  107.1  110 
Kyrgyzstan 47.3  11.6  -75 
Ukraine 422.7  969.7  129 
Georgia 87.7  204.3  133 
Fuel importers average (8)  93.5  156.8  68 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2004 
Taking into account great difference in energy resources endowment across CIS countries, it is 
convenient to differentiate between the following two country groups: 
1. fuel exporters (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan). Energy products con-
stituted some 70% of total exports of these countries during 2001-2003. By and large, the majority 
of the FDI into these countries is energy resources exploitation. While FDI in manufacturing, agri-
culture, and services lagged behind. 
2. fuel importers (Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, 
and Belarus). Energy products average some 30% of total imports for these countries. 
Foreign direct investment into the first group of countries (fuel exporters) has a different char-
acter than FDI into the other CIS countries. Energy exploitation projects reflect such considerations 
as the size, quality, and location of energy deposits: less weight is placed on the country’s overall 
investment climate (Tondel, 2001). Also, the energy sector is often supported by special tax re-
gimes with investment incentives
13. If they so desire, fuel exporters can therefore attract larger 
amounts of FDI than other countries, regardless of the quality of their business environments. 
In the group of fuel exporters, Russia represents the special case as its population is equal to 
roughly 144 million people, suggesting that market motivation is also important objective for foreign 
investors. This explains also higher sector diversification of FDI inflows into Russia, where foreign 
investments into fuel and petrochemicals represent only about 20% of total FDI
14. At the same 
                                                  
13   Shiells, C. (2003). FDI and the Investment Climate in the CIS countries. IMF Policy Discussion Paper. 
14   The food processing sector accounts for the largest share of Russia’s inward FDI, while oil extraction has attracted the 
second largest share.   
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time, more than 70% of FDI inflows to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan went into oil and 
gas sectors. 
Figure 3. Inward FDI per cent share in gross fixed capital formation 
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Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2004. 
The industrial composition of FDI inflows to the second group of countries (fuel importers) is 
more diversified because these flows were motivated by mainly market seeking motivations, while 
efficiency seeking motivations were the least important for the foreign companies operated in the 
CIS countries (UNCTAD, 2003). Therefore, they show higher shares of FDI in such sectors as bank-
ing, telecommunications, and utilities. In this respect, the CIS fuel importers are more like the ad-
vanced CEB transition economies, where the composition of FDI is gradually shifting from manufac-
turing towards services. For instance, in Ukraine the sectors that traditionally attract the large 
shares of FDI were food processing and retail trade, which usually give investors quick, relatively 
low-risk returns compared to other sectors. In Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, privatizations in the 
energy sector have attracted the largest share of FDI inflows; whereas in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan, large gold mine projects have accounted for the bulk of inward FDI, (Shiells, 2003). 
Table 3. Origins of FDI flows into CIS countries 
Host country  Source country 
Azerbaijan  USA, UK, Turkey, Russia, Italy 
Russia  Germany, USA, UK, Cyprus 
Kazakhstan  USA, Canada, Turkey, Japan 
Turkmenistan  USA, UK, Malaysia 
Armenia  Russia, Greece, USA, France 
Tajikistan  UK, Canada, USA, South Korea, Russia 
Uzbekistan  UK, Malaysia, Turkey 
Belarus Russia,  Germany 
Moldova  Russia, USA, Spain, UK, France 
Kyrgyzstan  Canada, USA, Germany, Turkey 
Ukraine  USA, Cyprus, UK, Netherlands, Virgin Islands, Germany, Russia Austria 
Georgia  USA, UK, Azerbaijan, Russia 
Source: UNCTAD (2004), Shiells (2003), EBRD (2002), Tondel (2001). 
Most of the FDI invested in CIS countries comes from the USA, Russia, and Western Europe 
(see Table 3). Russian companies are becoming increasingly active in the region, due to their ex- 
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perience in restructuring post-Soviet enterprises and their desire to gain control over their value 
chains. Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were the top destinations of Russian FDI dur-
ing 2002-2003. Russia’s LUKoil initiated $3billion greenfield gas exploration project in Kazakhstan 
during this time, while Russia’s Mobile Telesystem partially acquired the largest Ukrainian mobile 
operator UMC in 2003. In the Turkish speaking areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus there is a 
notable Turkish presence. Asian investments play some role in Central Asia (Tondel, 2001). 
Taking into account the current dynamics of FDI flows into CIS region, the medium-term pros-
pects for growth of FDI are very good and expected to increase in 2004-2005. 
3. What Makes Business Climates Less Favorable in the CIS? 
Many of the obstacles in the CIS to business activities in general and to FDI in particular can 
be explained by the “grabbing hand” paradigm (Shleifer and Frye, 1997), emphasizing the preda-
tory nature of state agencies. Uncoordinated bribery by state agencies can devastate business, as 
herd overgrazing can devastate commonly owned fields. “Grabbing hand” problems are less se-
vere in healthy democratic states, where civil society controls restrain predation. But they should 
also be smaller in countries where non-democratic regimes are strong enough to coordinate the 
activities of state agencies, and thereby prevent “excessive predation”. By contrast, “grabbing 
hand” problems could be especially severe in young states like the most of CIS countries in the 
early 1990s—but they should decline as state building progresses. 
However, the same state officials and agencies that prey on the new private sector also facili-
tate the subsidization of “privileged enterprises”, many of which predate the transition and are af-
filiated with important persons. The grabbing hand in CIS countries therefore is a part of the busi-
ness-state relations known as “nomenklatura capitalism” that are characteristic to post-communist 
CIS countries. Nomenklatura capitalism refers to informal networks of state officials, business peo-
ple, and criminal structures that are linked together by reputation, family relations, and compromis-
ing dossiers (kompromat) (Ledeneva, 2000)
15. These networks prevent the establishment of the 
rule of law needed for the undistorted development of business climates in CIS countries. 
Problems of political corruption linked to the grabbing hand are of course found in other post-
communist countries (Karklins, 2002), as well as in developing countries more generally. In the 
CIS, however, they are more serious than in CEB countries, for a number of reasons. We argue 
that this type of corruption is often rooted in traditions of extensive bureaucratic discretion that 
make Soviet and post-Soviet state agencies so different from Weberian bureaucracies. Volkov 
(2000) explains the emergence of the social traditions facilitating these networks by the patrimonial 
legacy of Moscovy, which had a much stronger impact on CIS than CEB and Balkan countries. The 
similar rent-seeking networks in many CEB countries were restrained by the implementation of far-
reaching market and political reforms. The emergence of civil society and other democratic con-
trols has helped restrict the most harmful kinds of corruption and predation in the CEB countries. 
                                                  
15   From the sociological perspective they were at least partly grounded on the specific socio-cultural phenomenon known 
as blat (Ledeneva, 1998).  
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4. Conclusions and policy implications 
Survey data on business conditions in CIS countries are not unambiguous or above methodo-
logical reproach. They do suggest, however, that business climates are significantly worse in these 
countries than in the new EU member states, and often worse than in the Balkans. They also point 
to significant variation among business climates in the CIS countries themselves. If these data are 
correct, then spreading “best practices” within the CIS region may be more effective than attempt-
ing to transplant CEB practices, due to the institutional and cultural commonalities of doing busi-
ness in CIS countries. 
Corruption, security of property rights, tax administration, customs, and macroeconomic instabil-
ity (or perceptions therein) seem to be particularly important concerns for business people in CIS 
countries. Most of these problems can be addressed by policy reform, however. In Ukraine, Russia, 
and some other CIS countries, the discretion wielded by tax officials has been significantly restricted 
for individual entrepreneurs and micro businesses through the introduction of lump-sum (and other 
simplified) taxes. In Ukraine and Russia, these reforms led to significant increases in small business 
activity without generating harmful fiscal side effects. In Ukraine, budget revenues received from 
“simplified” tax payers increased six-fold following the broad introduction of lump sum taxes
16. The 
depth of customs problems facing companies can be partly addressed by trade liberalization (within 
or outside of the WTO framework), and fears of macroeconomic instability can be addressed by the 
continuation of the monetary and fiscal policy frameworks introduced following the 1998 financial 
crisis. The sustained pursuit of judicial reform, and avoidance populistic reprivatization campaigns, 
can strengthen entrepreneurs’ belief in the sanctity of their property holdings. 
These conclusions suggest a number of concrete policy recommendations: 
•  General simplification of legislation, making it less vulnerable to selective interpretation, imple-
mentation, and punishment – even at the expense of flexibility. Carry out functional review of 
government agencies to clarify their functions and responsibilities. 
•  Maintaining stable macroeconomic policies including prudential fiscal and monetary policies. 
•  Improving the transparency of legislative processes. All regulations along with their justifica-
tions, cost-benefit analysis, and comments of independent experts, should be exposed to the 
public scrutiny (for example, via Internet) well in advance to their official consideration – even 
at the expense of slower legislative progress. 
•  Further development of the financial sector, including private banks, insurance companies, and 
pension funds. 
•  Improve system of corporate governance and in particular legislation related to minority share-
holder rights protection. 
•  Issues of excessive or discretionary customs burdens can be addressed by trade liberalization 
(within or outside of the WTO framework). 
                                                  
16   For more detail about Ukraine, see Dubrovskiy (2003).  
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•  The sustained pursuit of judicial reform, in order to provide better formal mechanisms for the 
resolution of commercial disputes. 
•  Avoidance of populist reprivatization campaigns and other egalitarian actions. 
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